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Previous work on inter-ethnic coexistence in Mauritius has portrayed secularism as the only
possible site of the national, which is at the same time described as clearly separated from
religious traditions. In contrast, focusing on understandings of secularism among Mauritian
Muslims in the context of a politics of diasporic ‘ancestral cultures’, this article analyses
secularism as a field of morality which is inseparable from questions of religious reform and
authenticity. The discussion of ethnographic material from Mauritius suggests that the opposition
between secularity and religiosity should be treated as a productive tension rather than a liberal
antinomy.
Recent anthropological studies of diasporas have highlighted their transnational ori-
entation towards multiple political locations, which frequently places diasporas at odds
with a prevailing global political order. Diasporic identifications do not, however,
always stand in tension with national belonging. Indeed, the public performance of
such identifications in ethnic holidays, religious festivals, ethnic cultural centres, and
the state-sponsored cultivation of ancestral languages is one of the ways in which full
membership in a Mauritian nation is claimed and demonstrated (cf. Eriksen ).
Mauritians, who publicly celebrate a continuing memory of their origins in another
part of the world through such activities, often experience diasporic belonging through
the prism of purist, clearly demarcated, and officially recognized ‘ancestral cultures’.
These two themes come together in a hegemonic sense of cultural citizenship accord-
ing to which Mauritians are primarily conceived as subjects with origins elsewhere and
ongoing commitments to traditions whose diasporic character is highlighted (Eisen-
lohr in press). Although in the s and early s a political movement promoted
a new Mauritian nationalism privileging locally created cultural forms, in particular
the dominant local vernacular language Mauritian Creole as a base for Mauritian post-
colonial nation-building, Mauritian state institutions clearly emphasize support and
recognition of cultural traditions perceived as diasporic.1 That is, the cultural politics
of the Mauritian state privileges ‘ancestral cultures’, experienced as diasporic insofar as
their origins elsewhere are publicly emphasized, over those traditions which can be
constructed as indigenous, such as the practice of Mauritian Creole.2 At the same time,
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since these recognized ‘ancestral cultures’ circumscribed by the state are largely iden-
tified with different religious traditions, the Mauritian politics of diaspora raises the
question of equitable coexistence in an officially multi-religious polity.
In this article, I investigate how a politics of diaspora privileging the performance
of ‘ancestral cultures’ centred on religious traditions is predicated on a particular
understanding of secularism. In this I recognize the close interrelationships between
the advent of a modern nation-state based on the conception of a society subject to
secular techniques of social transformation and the concept of ‘religion’ as a separate
sphere of life distinct from politics, society, and law (Asad ). Religious traditions
in the Mauritian case become the object of modern secular statecraft, to be managed
as potentially dangerous forces while at the same time mobilized for the good of
society. This is because they are considered indispensable for providing the kind of
self-discipline among citizens that enables toleration and peaceful coexistence between
members of different religious communities in a common polity.
In what follows, I problematize the antinomy between the secular and the religious
by investigating local understandings of secularism among Mauritian Muslims. While
others have suggested that modern concepts of ‘religion’ are an outcome of the rise of
secular perspectives on social life (Asad : -), I argue that the relationship
between secularity and religion should be seen as a productive tension in which the
religious crucially shapes secular practices and visions of social life. Indeed, central
symbols and ideologies of secularism may be mediated through the mystical and the
religious (Navaro-Yashin : -). While parallels between the engagement with,
for example, secular symbols of nationality and what is readily recognized as religious
practice have frequently been remarked, my concern here is morality as a sphere in
which the secular and the religious are in a dialectical tension. Secularism in Mauri-
tius is constituted as a field of morality focused on the shaping of dispositions con-
ducive to coexistence, which are never separate from those practices and traditions
aimed at shaping pious subjects. In particular, I seek to show how a regime of state
neutrality towards religious traditions which at the same time draws on ‘moral values’
as furthering toleration and peaceful coexistence among religiously diverse citizens
becomes entangled in the cause of religious reform. Focusing on Muslim debates about
the authenticity of different Islamic traditions, I demonstrate how such debates not
only are conducted in terms of a genealogical logic of relating Islamic practice to scrip-
tural sources via reliable chains of interlocutors but also address the Mauritian state’s
politics of mobilizing ‘ancestral’ religious values in order to shape responsible citizens
suitable for successful coexistence with others in an officially plural society. In other
words, the Mauritian politics of diasporic ‘ancestral cultures’ is based on a particular
understanding of secularism, which in turn becomes a driving force in debates about
religious reform and authenticity among Mauritian Muslims.
The governmentality of secularism
The main supporters of this particular form of Mauritian nationalism according to
which membership in the nation and the intense cultivation of diasporic links are not
only compatible, but actually reinforce each other, are the middle class among the
Hindu majority of Mauritius ( per cent), particularly those of North Indian origin
( per cent). The latter dominate Mauritian politics and state institutions. Mauritius
is singular among locations in the South Asian diaspora since almost  per cent of
its population is of Indian origin. Among Indo-Mauritians, Mauritian Muslims are
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recognized as a separate community in the constitution, comprising  per cent of the
population of . million. As is the case for Hindus, for Muslims religious traditions
are considered as largely coterminous with the ‘ancestral culture’ through which their
place in a Mauritian nation is defined and legitimized, thereby problematizing the
boundaries between religious traditions and national identity. The vision of Maurit-
ian national identity drawn in this politics of ancestral cultures is above all an ensem-
ble of ancestral and diasporic religious traditions, in which the continuing visibility of
boundaries between ethno-religious communities in national politics as well as in
everyday life does not contradict the idea of coexistence.
Mauritian state institutions encourage the cultivation of diasporic ‘ancestral cul-
tures’ in the context of a wider Mauritian political ideal of ‘unity in diversity’ and
ethno-religious even-handedness. These ‘ancestral cultures’ centred on religious tradi-
tions were shaped and circumscribed under colonialism, and their cultivation is
favoured because they are believed to be sites of ‘moral values’ to be instilled in Mau-
ritian citizens. In a Gandhian discourse, such moral values as part of religious tradi-
tions are presented as providing a counterweight to forces of agonistic competition
and materialism held to be prevalent in modernizing societies. According to this per-
spective, they orientate citizens towards tolerance and coexistence. Thus, the Maurit-
ian state generously subsidizes the activities of religious organizations, massively assists
in the public celebration of religious holidays and pilgrimages, provides for the teach-
ing of ancestral languages in state schools, and substantially contributes to the estab-
lishment of ‘cultural centres’, which in most cases have an openly ethnic-religious
agenda for all those with recognized claims on an ‘ancestral culture’.3
As such, Mauritian ‘unity in diversity’, understood as neutrality of the state towards
religion, is at odds with projects of secularism centred on an emphatic separation of
state and religious institutions. Examples of the latter would be French politics of laïcité
aiming to exclude religious symbols and discourse from political debate and state insti-
tutions (Baubérot ), the legal doctrine of a ‘wall of separation’ between state and
religious institutions in the United States, or more aggressive forms of secularism as a
dismantling of religious institutions by the state and placing those which remain under
strict state control, as in Turkey (Göle ). Mauritian secularism, however, has much
in common with the politics of secularism in India. As in India, the Mauritian popu-
lation is officially divided into ‘communities’, with religion being the most prominent
criterion of division,4 and religious communities and their symbols are expected to be
very visible in the public sphere. Citizenship is thus qualified by religious membership.
As religious belonging is conceived as a primary identification for most citizens, pol-
itics should be ideally guided by the equal recognition of all religious traditions and
neutrality towards them.
Analyses of Indian secularism have identified two important themes in discourses
of India as a secular nation. First, an antagonism between an educated secular elite and
the uneducated masses is highlighted. Here it becomes the task of the secular elite to
control the religious passions of the masses in order to enable peaceful and equitable
coexistence (Chatterjee ) and to enforce a separation between ‘culture’, located in
traditional ‘communities’, and ‘politics’ (Hansen ). In particular, Western-style
education is considered to turn subjects into responsible and rational Indian citizens.
A second theme is the Gandhian distinction between authentic and benign ‘faith’ and
‘perverted’, ideologized religion manifest in violent communalism geared towards a
maximizing of political power. While the former shapes citizens towards tolerance and
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peaceful coexistence in a spirit of ‘true’ religiosity and moral rectitude, the latter,
encouraging hatred and intolerance, is the bane of a plural society. In contrast to those
emphasizing the importance of secular and Western-style education for countering
religious passions, proponents of this Gandhian position see the destruction of
‘genuine’ religious tradition among the populace in the name of a secularist politics of
modernization as the chief culprit behind intercommunal violence in contemporary
India. Along these lines, Ashis Nandy () has called for the recovery of presumably
authentic religious traditions of popular faith in India which favour peaceful coexis-
tence in order to fight violent Hindu nationalism. According to Nandy, Hindu nation-
alism represents an instance of ‘perverted religion’ (: ) resulting from the
‘contest for the allegiance of the decultured, the atomised and massified’, who exem-
plify the Indian middle class and urban India in general (: ).
The Gandhian rhetoric of ‘true’ religiosity as fostering mutual respect and peaceful
coexistence is also central to Mauritian understandings of secularism, which is often
portrayed as engaged in a combat against a destructive communalism (kominalis in
Mauritian Creole) drawing on religious identifications.5 Mauritian understandings of
secularism build on a related colonial genealogy and are also centred on the principle
of state neutrality towards religious traditions rather than on an avoidance of state
intervention in religious affairs or of the use of religious imagery and discourse in pol-
itics. Nevertheless, compared to the modernist-statist theme in Indian discourses of
secularism, the relationship in the regulation of the religion-politics nexus between an
educated elite of state functionaries and the masses is conceived in an almost inverse
way. Instead of assuming that the masses are easily consumed by religious passions and
continue to act and identify as religious communities, state discourse in Mauritius
highlights an apprehension of a decline of religious traditions and the moral values
supposed to be enshrined in them in a process of rapid modernization and develop-
ment. Accordingly, the task of state institutions is to ensure that ‘ancestral cultures’, as
sites of moral values, are promoted so as to combat the social anomie and moral cor-
ruption potentially endangering the ‘social fabric’ of Mauritian society. As such, Mau-
ritian secularism can be understood as a strategy of governmentality, a technique 
of regulating social life in the context of controlling the welfare of a population 
(Foucault ). This strategy is different from secularism as a scientific mode of
governance in India as it has been analysed by Chatterjee (). The particularity of
Mauritian secularism is that it ostensibly draws on a Gandhian critique of modern-
ization, which is then paradoxically recast in terms of a project of modern governance.
Armoogum Parsuraman, minister of education and arts and culture from  to
, repeatedly stressed that the Mauritian state seeks to fight the negative conse-
quences of rapid economic modernization through the teaching of ancestral cultural
values in the context of ancestral language instruction, which in turn is inseparable
from promoting particular ancestral religious traditions (Parsuraman ). Address-
ing a Muslim audience on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the National
Urdu Institute in , the minister asserted that the promotion of ancestral languages
was the ‘leitmotiv of my Ministry’ and declared: ‘In tune with the policy of our Gov-
ernment, my Ministry has left no stone unturned to promote the various cultures of
our pluri-ethnic society through all kinds of possible assistance’.6 Also, in a message to
the almost exclusively Muslim audience present at the Second World Urdu Conference
held in Mauritius in August , Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth repeated the offi-
cial rationale for the promotion of ancestral religious traditions:
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The cultural fabric of our society is consolidated by the rich ancestral values and traditions of our
Urdu-Speaking compatriots … Government will continue to provide its unflinching support to the
endeavours of the various religious and socio-cultural organizations geared towards the consolida-
tion of our cultural fabric. Let us join hands together to bring national unity, peace and harmony in
our country. This is a sine qua non for achieving progress, happiness and brotherhood.7
In similar terms Jugnauth hailed the foundation of a Ramayana Centre run by an
alliance of Mauritian and Indian Hindu organizations, some with Hindu nationalist
ties, on a plot of land donated by the Mauritian state, since ‘it [is] very important to
perpetuate human values, particularly in the present context when crimes have
increased, family breakups and divorces are frequent and moral commitment has lost
its meaning’.8 He stressed that only ‘socio-cultural organizations’, which in Mauritian
public discourse refer to religious organizations with an ethnic agenda, ‘can in a real
sense be the answer to today’s social problems’, while the Ramayana Centre ‘would play
a pivotal role for the moral and social uplift of the society at large’.9 Accordingly, such
moral values, supposedly inherent in ‘ancestral cultures’ and associated ancestral lan-
guages, enable Mauritians to live spiritually and economically fruitful lives in solidar-
ity with others. While they are held to be vital in their capacity to control an unfettered
competition for material goods and benefits between citizens, they are thought of as
increasingly scarce under conditions of rapid economic transformation, technical
development, and increased prosperity. Western-style education, which the great
majority of Mauritians now undergo, is believed insufficient to instil the spirit of
coexistence and respect for the other which can be provided only by the values of
‘ancestral’ religious traditions.
Secular politics and religious authenticity
In contrast to the Indian politics of secularism with its deep ambivalence about the
social effects of religious traditions on a ‘composite’ society, official Mauritian state
ideologies portray the social and political consequences of an intense cultivation of
religious traditions in more optimistic terms. When former Prime Minster Anerood
Jugnauth made his well-known declaration that throughout his long years as a prime
minister ‘in politics and statecraft the Ramayana has been my greatest ideal’10 and that
his economic policies were guided by the principles of ‘bhakti and shakti’,11 he did not
consider himself making a ‘communalist’ statement openly favouring Hindu religious
traditions and political interests over others.12 Instead, he presented himself as being
guided by perennial values enshrined in the Ramayana and its teachings, values also
immanent in other traditions and thought to enable just government and equitable
coexistence. As a consequence of this identification of ‘moral values’ with peaceful
coexistence, secular politics in Mauritius is often couched in a discourse on religious
tradition.
Concern about moral values inhabiting ‘ancestral cultures’ cannot be de-coupled
from concerns about religious reform and authenticity. One of the consequences of
such strategies of shaping citizens suitable for coexistence in an officially plural society
through ancestral moral values is a heightening of conflict about the authenticity of
such ancestral traditions. This is because ancestral religious traditions deemed authen-
tic also play a central role in moral debates about equitable coexistence in an officially
multi-religious polity. Here the Gandhian separation of presumably genuine religios-
ity and destructive religious communalism is of great importance for explaining a link
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between religious reform, authenticity, and secularism. Secularism in the Mauritian
context often means supporting those ancestral traditions which are authentic repre-
sentatives of a Gandhian ‘true’ religiosity. Both representatives of state institutions and
many Mauritians in everyday contexts emphasize that only those ancestral traditions
deemed authentic and validly founded have the power to shape Mauritian national
subjects in a spirit of peaceful and equitable coexistence. Among Mauritian Muslims
such concerns about authentic and inauthentic dimensions of religious traditions have
intensified debates about who speaks for authentic Islam in Mauritius. However, in
asserting their superiority over exponents of other Islamic traditions, it is not enough
for participants in these debates to claim to be better Muslims than others or to insist
that their standpoints are more reliably connected to sources of Islamic authenticity
such as the Qur’an or the Hadith (the authoritative record of the words and doings of
the Prophet and his companions). They must also situate themselves in relation to a
discourse of coexistence and the shaping of Mauritian citizens suitable for that task.
That is, debates about Islamic tradition are intimately linked to Mauritian politics of
secularism. ‘Ancestral’ religious traditions such as Islam constitute vital components of
national identity and are also thought to play a key role in ensuring successful coexis-
tence among Mauritius’s citizens. Although often presented as far removed from pol-
itics, the theme of ‘true’ religiosity is central to the discourse of coexistence. ‘Ancestral
culture’ therefore erases the boundaries between ‘private’ or community-based religion
and the politics of nationhood.
Muslim identities and Islamic traditions in Mauritius
The establishment of a Muslim community in Mauritius is above all the result of the
indenture system, through which hundreds of thousands of Indian labourers were
exported to work on sugar plantations in other parts of the British Empire, Mauritius
being the destination receiving the single largest number of migrants between  and
the First World War (Carter ). Nevertheless, a small number of Indian Muslims
had already arrived under French colonial rule (-) while, as early as the s,
free trader-immigrants of Muslim Gujarati background had begun migrating to Mau-
ritius. Supported by their capital and intense continuing links to India, the Gujarati
traders emerged as a social elite among the Indian and Indo-Mauritian population and
became the principal founders and promoters of Islamic institutions on the island
(Kalla ). Thus, even though primarily of North Indian indenture background,
Muslims in Mauritius were from the beginning characterized by important ethnic and
class differences, which had a major impact on the local practice of Islamic traditions
and the formation of political identities among Muslims in Mauritius.
The Kutchi Memons, a trader caste originally from Gujarat but with dense networks
throughout India and the Indian Ocean region, soon established themselves as the
most economically successful of these Gujarati elites and also became central to the
formation of an Islamic establishment of mosques, madrasas (religious schools), and
links to Islamic institutions in India. The Memons in particular cultivated a close rela-
tionship with the tradition of the Sunni South Asian Ahl-e Sunnat va Jamaat (‘People
of the Prophet’s way and the majority community’, hereafter Ahl-e Sunnat), which in
the s and s became the predominant form of institutionalized Sunni Islam in
Mauritius and is locally known as the Sunnat Jamaat.13 The Ahl-e Sunnat, also known
in South Asia as the Barelwi tradition, is one of the reformist traditions which emerged
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in nineteenth-century Indian Islam. In contrast to other, more familiar reformist tra-
ditions of Indian Islam, such as the school of Deoband, the Ahl-e Sunnat is known for
its great emphasis on practices of intercession (Sanyal ). These entail the venera-
tion of Sufi saints and a particular understanding of the Prophet Muhammad defined
through the doctrine of hazir-o nazir (present and observant), according to which the
Prophet continues to have a spiritual presence manifest as pure light (nur-e muham-
madi). Following this tradition, the Prophet’s powers of intercession with God can be
appealed to by means of the recitation of poetry in praise of the Prophet (nat) during
ritual gatherings known as mawlud or mahfil-e mawlud as well as through the collec-
tive recitation of Urdu panegyric poetry and Arabic litanies in praise of the Prophet
(darud), which is known as salam and performed after the Friday prayers.
Among Muslims, Memon dominance enabled by their wealth and connections to
centres of Islamic learning in India had gone hand in hand with local control over the
most important Islamic institutions. Beginning in the s two major changes
brought about challenges to this hegemony. First, Muslims of indenture (Kalkattiya)
background experienced the beginnings of wider social mobility, as some Kalkattiya
families attained middle-class status via new opportunities for higher education in
India and Britain. This led to the formation of a steadily growing class of profession-
als of indenture background who were less inclined to accept the continued social and
political dominance of the Memons. Second, representatives of the school of Deoband
started to establish themselves in greater numbers in Mauritius. The Sunni Surtees,
another Gujarati trader community in fierce competition with the Memons, initially
played a key role in introducing the Deobandi tradition to Muslims in Mauritius. In
 the Surtees completed the construction of their Markazi Mosque in Port Louis,
which became a centre for an intensifying relationship between the Surtees and
Deobandi scholars and preachers from India. It came to function as a social counter-
weight to the established main Jummah Mosque of the capital, run by the Memons.
Most importantly, the Deoband-affiliated Tablighi Jamaat, the single most powerful
transnational Islamic missionizing movement in the world today, arrived in Mauritius
in the late s.14 In Mauritius, the Tablighis were initially closely linked to the Surtee
community, but they were also very successful in attracting a steadily growing number
of Muslims of indenture background (see also Hollup ). They thus emerged as a
formidable challenge to the dominance of the Sunnat Jamaat and their local Memon
patrons to the extent that today the number of their followers in Mauritius is com-
monly said to approach the numbers of the diminished Sunnat Jamaat constituency.
Urdu and Arabic as Muslim ‘ancestral languages’
A central part of a Mauritian cultural politics of ‘unity in diversity’ centred on the pro-
motion of diasporic ‘ancestral cultures’ is the teaching and official valorization of so-
called ancestral languages (lang ban anset in Mauritian Creole); these are Hindi, Urdu,
Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, Arabic, and Mandarin. The  per cent of students in Maurit-
ian government or government-assisted schools who do not belong to the Christian
‘general population’ are automatically assigned from primary level to the study of one
of these languages. Selection and assignment to the study of a particular ancestral lan-
guage is performed according to the students’ ethnic-religious background, which
school authorities routinely identify by the students’ names and locally known ethnic
affiliations. Ancestral languages are never used in everyday life and were in most cases
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not even current among immigrating ancestors of the people claiming them as their
ethnic property. However, they are considered essential mediators and components of
official ‘ancestral cultures’. Since the ‘ancestral cultures’ of the Indo-Mauritian popu-
lation are largely defined by religious traditions, the authenticity of the respective
ancestral languages is above all measured by their perceived significance for such tra-
ditions. Enabled by linguistic ideologies (Woolard & Schieffelin ) constructing pre-
sumably self-evident links between particular linguistic and religious traditions, those
cultivating an officially recognized ancestral language strengthen their claims on mem-
bership in a Mauritian nation conceived above all as an ensemble of diasporic tradi-
tions. Official ancestral languages represent a key instance of state intervention in
religious traditions aimed at mobilizing the latter for a project of secularism focused
on state neutrality towards such traditions while simultaneously promoting them to
strengthen social and political cohesion through moral uplift.
Nevertheless, the significance and authenticity of ancestral languages has sometimes
become a focus of conflict among Mauritians, especially among Mauritian Muslims,
who represent the only Mauritian ethnic community with two officially recognized
ancestral languages. The contest between promoters of Urdu and Arabic as ancestral
languages for Mauritian Muslims is in turn closely related to the conflict between the
supporters of the previously hegemonic Sunnat Jamaat (Barelwi) tradition and the
more recently expanding Tablighi movement, the main representatives of the Deobandi
tradition in Mauritius. Although none among the contestants openly declare them-
selves to be against Arabic or Urdu, respectively, Mauritian students in government or
government-assisted schools can only study one ancestral language, which for Muslim
students amounts to a choice between Urdu and Arabic. Parents who are affiliated with
the Sunnat Jamaat are most likely to demand Urdu to be taught as ancestral language
to Muslim students, while those affiliated with the Tablighi movement or other
Deoband-associated traditions tend to favour the study of Arabic over Urdu. The
choice between Arabic and Urdu, imposed as a matter of prioritization in the context
of a Mauritian cultural policy of ‘ancestral cultures’ and ancestral languages, is thus
informed by language ideologies centred on perceptions of the relative link of these
two languages to places and traditions of Islamic authority. Those drawing a positive
image of the place of Indo-Pakistan as a site of Muslim life and Islamic authenticity
also argue for the primacy of the study of Urdu for what they regard as the ‘Islamic
culture’ of Mauritians of Indian origin. In contrast, those who are suspicious of the
authenticity of South Asian Islamic practice and who view Mauritian Islamic tradi-
tions as being in serious need of purification and reform tend to favour the study of
Arabic over Urdu, considering the former as essentially connected to what they see as
the original sources of Islam. Although it was impossible for followers of the Sunnat
Jamaat and Urdu teachers to argue against the teaching of Arabic per se, they pointed
out that standard Arabic was difficult to learn and that, unlike the case with Urdu, the
great majority of Mauritian Muslims would never gain any meaningful access to the
language. The opponents of Arabic as an ancestral language also argued that the per-
petuation of authentic Islamic traditions in Mauritius would depend on the cultiva-
tion of Urdu, given the Indian background of Mauritian Muslims. They claimed that
the introduction of Arabic would result in a decline in the knowledge of Urdu and that
Arabic would never be properly learned by the great majority of students. As a conse-
quence, ‘Islamic culture’ in Mauritius would be undermined by a choice of Arabic as
the ‘ancestral language’ of Mauritian Muslims.
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Debating Islamic tradition in the context of secularism
What are the local meanings and practices of secularism in Mauritius, where the pol-
itics of secularism are based on an ideal of state neutrality towards a plurality of offi-
cially recognized religious traditions and where discourses of secularism often draw
on moral values in calling for equitable coexistence? Among Mauritian Muslims, this
ethos of coexistence is most often talked about in a language of religious reform and
authenticity and is also mobilized for claims of superiority over competing interpre-
tations and practices of Islam. At the same time, Muslim debates about religious reform
are linked to the politics of nationhood and coexistence because the authenticity of
Muslim ‘ancestral culture’, the subject of these debates, underpins Muslim member-
ship in a Mauritian nation.
Given the ongoing rivalry especially between Barelwis and Deobandis, the authen-
ticity of Islamic traditions is a very contested issue in Mauritius. At the same time,
Mauritian Muslims link the question of religious authenticity to the issue of diasporic
origins in different ways. Some privilege South Asia as an authentic centre of Islamic
traditions, others promote a presumably ‘pure’ Islam, which they portray as directly
connected to centres of authority in the Arab world. The rhetoric of the latter
approach, however, can also be situated in Indian traditions of Islam dating back to at
least the eighteenth century. Here Muslim debates in Mauritius closely resemble similar
disputes in other parts of the Muslim world, where proponents of a return to pristine
orthodoxy are confronted with others who insist on the value of those Islamic prac-
tices which have grown up in their communities over hundreds of years. However, the
specificity of these debates in Mauritius is that they are more closely connected to issues
of coexistence and secularism in a religiously and ethnically plural society than in many
other locales where such debates are unfolding. This is because in arguing about the
authenticity of Islamic traditions and Urdu or Arabic as ancestral languages, the par-
ticipants in these debates also construct relationships to state-sponsored and recog-
nized Muslim ‘ancestral culture’ and therefore to secularism as a moral project.
There are a fair number of people claiming to be Muslim authorities and spokes-
men for all Muslims in Mauritius, each asserting to represent authentic Islam accord-
ing to a genealogical logic of faithful transmission. Followers of the Deobandi tradition
advocate a purified Islam which combines religious reform and the fight against social
problems such as crime, drugs, and family disintegration. They justify their claims not
just in terms of an internal debate about authentic Islamic tradition but also by
addressing the politics of secularism, indicating the benefits that their project would
contribute to Mauritian society as a whole through shaping more morally responsible
and educated citizens. At the same time, in a discourse of ‘anti-politics’ (Hansen :
; : ), they deny that their project has any political dimensions but stress its
contribution to the presumably perennial and sublime moral and spiritual values
which enable Mauritian coexistence.
Muhammad Dahal, the head of the Qur’an House in the central town of Rose-Hill,
considered that the Muslim community was lacking knowledge of proper Islamic
conduct before the establishment in  of the Islamic Circle (of which the Qur’an
House is an offshoot). The Islamic Circle was co-founded by a Pakistani follower of
Mawlana Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, the founder of the Jamaat-e Islami, one of the pio-
neering movements of modern Islamism which also traces its origins to the tradition
of Deoband. Dahal viewed the particular Deobandi tradition he stands for as superior
not only because of what he claimed to be its greater scriptural authenticity, but also
Patrick Eisenlohr 403
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) , -
© Royal Anthropological Institute 
for its stress on education and modernization. He advocated a purified Islam that moti-
vates Mauritian Muslims to become educated and moral citizens:
Before  there was no awareness that Islam is a complete way of life, people just thought that it is
enough to practise prayer and rituals. Islam does not stop at prayer. Young people these days are more
dynamic and very avid to learn. They want to go to the sources of Islam directly. There is still the
influence of the Indian ancestral culture, but it will disappear over time with increased education.
Dahal effectively challenged the government-sponsored construction of official ‘ances-
tral cultures’ for different ethnic groups in Mauritius. ‘Ancestral cultures’ are typically
represented under the assumption that religious traditions and other dimensions of
such ‘ancestral cultures’ are largely indistinguishable. Dahal, on the other hand, argued
that the ‘ancestral culture’ of Indo-Mauritian Muslims and their authentic religious
tradition are not only distinct, but even at odds with each other. Contrary to the wide-
spread commitment to the reproduction or, as many in Mauritius say, ‘preservation’
of ‘ancestral cultures’, Dahal actually looks forward to their eventual demise across gen-
erations. Even though he himself represents a particular reformist tradition with a long
historical trajectory in India, according to him the weakening of diasporic traditions
from India would facilitate the emergence of authentic Muslims in Mauritius. He 
continued:
Young people today are more educated, they want to know the justification for certain rituals and
practices. And then their elders can only answer that they have always done so. This is especially so
with holding a mawlud, celebrating ‘urs [anniversaries of the demise of saints] and praying at dargah
[tombs of saints]. These practices have always been supported by the Jummah Mosque, but now
young people can see for themselves that they have little to do with the Qur’an and the Sunna [the
traditions of the Prophet]. Islam is above all about education, and in this we contribute to the mixture
of cultures we have in Mauritius.
Here Dahal combined the themes of religious reform and the spread of education in
a progressivist stance that goes hand in hand with his claim to contribute to the shaping
of good citizens who are morally fortified but nevertheless ‘modern’. The argument
that education will inevitably lead to a rejection of practices deemed ‘popular’ and ‘tra-
ditional’ by many was also emphasized by a Pakistani imam who was trained in the
Deobandi tradition and has resided in Mauritius for sixteen years. He is imam of a
mosque in a town in the main urban zone of Mauritius and director of the dar-ul ‘ulum
(Islamic academy) attached to it:
Barelwis are becoming Deobandi, and not the other way around. Especially educated people who
have studied about Islam, they cannot remain Barelwi. I have never seen a case where a Deobandi
became a Barelwi, but the reverse is happening all the time.
An important part of this concern about education and religious reform often
stressed by Deobandi leaders is the propagation of Arabic as the officially recognized
‘ancestral language’ instead of Urdu. According to them, knowledge of Arabic rather
than Urdu would enhance knowledge of scriptural sources of Islam. Muhammad Dahal
pointed out that ‘we were the pioneers of the study of Arabic in Mauritius, and the
first to demand the teaching of Arabic in public schools. And until today, teaching
Muslims Arabic has remained one of our priorities’. When Dahal claimed that young
people are less affected by the Indian cultural influence of their ancestors and want to
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access the ‘sources’ of Islam directly, he also had in mind the promotion of Arabic as
an ancestral language in Mauritian schools and the teaching of Arabic offered by his
own institution. Dahal supports state intervention in religion through the introduc-
tion of Arabic as a recognized ancestral language of Muslims in Mauritius. His claims
about a reformist Islam shaping educated and progressive citizens who positively con-
tribute to the ‘mixture of cultures’ in Mauritius are very much in line with the state’s
policy of securing equitable and peaceful coexistence through fortifying ‘ancestral cul-
tures’ with their religious traditions.
A link between the struggle against social problems and religious reform was also
stressed by Imam Beharry, a member of parliament and the imam of the Noor-e Islam
mosque in the capital, Port Louis. He owns a small furniture factory and leads a modest
lifestyle, and insisted that his MP allowance goes directly to the Noor-e Islam mosque.
Beharry was a student of Abdul Rachid Nawab, a Hejazi scholar who arrived from the
Arabian Peninsula in Mauritius in  and lived there until his death in . Imam
Beharry has performed the hajj three times and umrah (the minor pilgrimage to
Mecca) once but has never visited India or Pakistan. He told me:
When I give addresses in the mosque, I do not speak about rituals, festivals, which rituals should be
held and when and how. But I address themes of actuality, speak against bad social practices. I have
personally fought against drug dealers, I have attacked them in my addresses and Friday sermons,
blocked their way in person in the street. Among the bad social practices is also the invocation of
saints, which is the biggest illness of the Muslim community, such as the worship at tombs or yawm-
un nabi [celebrating the birthday of the Prophet] and holding mawlud. These illicit innovations
cannot be found in the Qur’an or the Hadith and were invented so that people who were convert-
ing to Islam in India back then would continue to be attracted to Islam.
The imam thus drew a direct connection between social ills and ‘bad’ ritual practices.
Accordingly, the task of religious reform and education also benefits Mauritian society
at large. A presumably more authentic, purified Islam was also favoured by a public
school Arabic teacher from a village in the South who had studied Arabic and Islamic
Studies in Saudi Arabia, principally at the University of Medina, for seven years:
The main point is that we who follow tawhid15 strictly reject intercession between believers and God.
Most of all, we do not call for the help of saints. The Qur’an is brutally clear in this respect. It is shirk
[idolatry].
Like many other proponents of a purist approach to Islam, he viewed the spread of
education and ‘true Islam’ as interlinked processes, a vision he extended to the teach-
ing of Arabic, as well: ‘These days people are more educated and can read the Qur’an
themselves, in French and English. My mission in teaching Arabic is to enable people
to learn to read the Qur’an directly’. The Tablighi Jamaat are the most prominent pro-
moters of the Deobandi tradition in Mauritius and they are especially known for pro-
moting an ‘anti-politics’ aimed at a profound transformation of society through moral
uplift. A lawyer in his office in the capital, who has been a long-standing member of
the Tablighi Jamaat, highlighted the non-confrontational attitude he believes should
inform religious reform and purification, and stressed the importance of influencing
others through personal example and practical commitment to an authentic Islam:
When we see a fellow Muslim who visits dargah, offers the salam after the Friday prayer and holds
mawlud in his home, we do not criticize him. We don’t think it is good to attack someone, we only
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want to persuade in a friendly and respectful way, because a good Muslim lives at peace with others.
Teaching the good, and preventing the bad through patience and persuasion and becoming a better
human being.
The lawyer added that many local Muslims had in the beginning been suspicious of
the Tablighis with their purist approach to Islamic practice:
They think of a hidden purpose, a political agenda, but there is none, and they do not understand
why. Some even suspect that we want an Islamic state. But we Muslims are a minority here and helping
people to become better human beings means that they will live in peace with everybody else.
Despite this insistence on avoiding politics, the claim of turning people into morally
improved and more peaceful persons through tabligh, the missionizing effort, invokes
the Mauritian project of secularism in its stress on moral values promoting coexis-
tence. The lawyer counted the study of Arabic instead of Urdu among the efforts that
Muslims in Mauritius can undertake to purify themselves through a close following of
the Qur’an and the Sunna, and Tablighi local circles frequently offer introductory
Arabic classes on a neighbourhood level, alongside classes in basic Islamic studies con-
ducted in Creole. The lawyer, himself of Gujarati origin, offered an additional
genealogical explanation as to why he considers the study of Arabic to be preferable
to learning Urdu: ‘Gujaratis are very mixed with and close to the Arabs’.
To sum up, the cultivation of Arabic as an ‘ancestral language’ in Mauritius is pre-
sented by its supporters as part of a wider project of religious and moral reform which
is justified not only in terms of greater authenticity within an Islamic tradition, but
also as contributing to the production of morally grounded citizens capable of coex-
istence with others. In this, proponents of purist religious reform also claim that their
demands are not only compatible with Mauritian secularism but actually support a
secular project of coexistence through the promotion of authentic ancestral traditions
inhabited by moral values.
Followers of the Sunnat Jamaat in turn by no means accept being labelled as pro-
moting a less authentic form of Islam. They rarely see a need for the reformist and
purifying agenda of the Deobandis, arguing that the reproduction of good Mauritian
Muslims depends on the cultivation of the Islamic traditions they see as having been
brought by their ancestors from India, which they consider not at all deficient in scrip-
tural authenticity. A student recently returned from studies at an Indian university
rejected the idea that Islamic practices current in Mauritius are in need of substantial
reform or that Mauritius should be considered a peripheral part of the Muslim world:
We may be far away from the Arab countries, but I do not feel cut off from Islam; I am not worried
about that. This is because we are originally from India and we have preserved many of the tradi-
tions from there. For example, you hear the azan [the call for prayer] almost everywhere in Mauri-
tius, you celebrate ‘Id al-fitr [the festival marking the end of Ramadan], and all the chicken meat for
sale in Mauritius is halal. But my cousin Asif who studied in England often had a problem with food;
he had to drive a long way to eat halal food. They are cut off. Even in India, Muslims have a lot of
problems and do not get good jobs. But in Mauritius we do not have these problems and most people
who are qualified get a good job. So there is no reason to feel cornered and cut off.
While comparing the situation of Mauritian Muslims to Muslims in India in favourable
terms, the student also rejected the rationale for the introduction of Arabic as an
‘ancestral language’:
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Our ancestors came from India, and we follow our traditions. And Arabic is of no use here, nobody
understands it, while Urdu is rather well known – there are films, radio, and television programmes
in Urdu, so those who learn Arabic lose out. The fanatic spirit of those who want Arabic and reject
our traditions is also bad for us because we are a minority and need to live in harmony with all other
Mauritians.
Here the student characterized those who want to reform and purify Mauritian Islamic
traditions and practices as too ‘fanatic’ to coexist successfully with others in a society
like Mauritius. He evoked the distinction between authentic, benign faith and destruc-
tive communalism. Here the defence of practices linked to the local contexts of Islamic
tradition also becomes part of a wider debate about Mauritian secularism as a moral
project. In the manner of their opponents, followers of the Sunnat Jamaat claim that
their vision of Islam is more authentic and represents a better way to shape good cit-
izens capable of coexistence with others. Further, Mauritian Barelwis, like their coun-
terparts in India and Pakistan, by no means cede the scripturalist field to their
Deobandi opponents, insisting that those ritual practices labelled as backward and
inauthentic by Deobandis are in fact justifiable in light of the Qur’an and the Sunna.
After Friday prayers in a Sunnat Jamaat-affiliated mosque in a suburb of Port Louis
more than half of the men present left immediately while those who remained gath-
ered closely around the imam, standing up and reciting salam. When I asked the friend
who had accompanied me to the mosque why most of the worshippers had left before
the salam, he replied: ‘Only those who are brainwashed are against the salam, because
the salam brings us closer to God via the Prophet’. An imam in a northern village also
defended the legitimacy of such practices of intercession: ‘All the poetry, all the nat
and qasida [another poetic genre used in eulogizing saints] were already there in
Arabia, they took it to India and from there to Mauritius. There was only a translation
into Urdu in between’. The imam insisted that these are laudable practices linked to
the ‘sources’ of Islam and bestowing additional benefits.
Finally, the supporters of the Barelwi tradition are suspicious about the introduc-
tion and growing popularity of Arabic in its competition with the previously estab-
lished Urdu to become the ancestral language for Mauritian Muslims. They often
charged that the introduction of Arabic into state schools is part of a scheme by the
Hindu-dominated government to divide and weaken the Muslim community. A
student claimed that ‘to destroy a community, you only need to introduce a second
ancestral language’. An Urdu teacher asserted that Arabic was introduced to schools to
divide the Muslims, especially in electoral districts such as Port Louis and Phoenix
where they are either a large group or the majority: ‘The government did not allow the
introduction of Sanskrit alongside Hindi for Hindus, but they introduce Arabic along-
side Urdu!’ He rejected such state interference in Muslim ‘ancestral culture’ not only
because of professional and material interests, but also because he thought it under-
mines the ‘Islamic culture’ of Muslims through which their position in the nation is
defined. Opting for Arabic is portrayed as motivated by financial incentives from oil-
rich Arab states such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, which, through the Libyan embassy
and Saudi-financed World Muslim League (Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami), initially played
key roles in promoting the study of Arabic among Mauritian Muslims. Many in par-
ticular recall the activities of the Libyan embassy in the late s and early s in
inducing local Muslims to support the propagation of Arabic by means of material
incentives at a time when poverty was still widespread. According to a retired civil
servant, those calling for Arabic as an ancestral language in the context of a specific
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reformist agenda have no right to claim the cause of moral purification and uplift. On
the contrary,
Arabic is just a matter of money. The Libyans offered these banquets with a lot of meat and chicken
which most people could not afford at the time. There was also the hope that through Arabic one
could get well-paid jobs in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. But Urdu is much more accessible than Arabic.
The consequence is that Urdu is neglected and that Muslims in Mauritius are losing their Islamic
culture.
Here, this man charged the advocates of Arabic with the same moral failings – mate-
rialism and greed – that the state-sponsored cultivation of ‘ancestral’ religious tradi-
tion seeks to overcome.
The rejection of the position of Deobandi reformers is not framed in a defence of
popular tradition, but in a discourse of Islamic learning, engaging reformist claims of
superior genealogical authority on their own terms. In a publication of the govern-
ment-sponsored Islamic Cultural Centre, Mawlana Shameem Ashraf Azhari, the
Indian-born imam of the Jummah Mosque of Port Louis and a graduate of Al-Azhar
University in Cairo, defended the centrality of Urdu for Mauritian Islam:
We can even say that Urdu has a major contribution in preserving our faith and culture on this island.
The language of the Holy Qur’an is Arabic but it is through Urdu books on Islam and Urdu trans-
lations of the Holy Book that many of us have come to comprehend the Word of Allah. The valu-
able commentaries of great ‘ulama [Islamic scholars] have also proved to be extremely useful,
especially that of Aala Hazrat Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (R.A.) [the founder of the Barelwi tradition
who was a very prolific writer in Urdu] … Our grandfathers used to celebrate mawlud functions,
which are part of our culture, and the nat that were recited on those occasions were mostly written
in Urdu. Through such activities both our culture and faith have been preserved and the light of
Islam has continued to illuminate the lives of people.16
While Deobandis justify the introduction of Arabic as a matter of greater genealog-
ical authority and as a contribution to education, their opponents seek to delegitimize
the study of Arabic as a matter of economic opportunism or as a ploy to divide the
Muslim community. Urdu is presented by Mawlana Shameem as the living medium of
Islamic tradition and as essential for the reproduction of true Islam and the moral
guidance that it provides Mauritian Muslims. Promoters of Urdu who are also fol-
lowers of the Sunnat Jamaat underline the legitimacy of their position by indicating
that the Mauritian government still recognizes the Sunnat Jamaat-affiliated Jummah
Mosque as representative of the Muslim community of Mauritius, despite that 
community’s internal divisions. While government intervention in official ‘Islamic
culture’ through the introduction of Arabic as second ancestral language has 
provoked considerable antagonism, a group of Urdu teachers nevertheless noted 
with satisfaction that on Muslim holidays such as yawm un-nabi and ‘Id al-fitr the 
government-controlled Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) only broadcasts
on television addresses in Urdu by the imam of the Jummah Mosque while on 
Fridays his sermons are broadcast on MBC radio. As noted by an Urdu teacher, who
admitted having been concerned about the future of his profession: ‘In the s we
were very worried that Arabic would take over completely. But as long as the govern-
ment recognizes the Jummah Mosque as our representatives we are protected from
Arabic’.
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Here also, an internal debate about authenticity within an Islamic tradition is linked
not only to the position of Mauritian Muslims within the nation but also to the moral-
ity of secularism. While the Deobandis and others labelled ‘Tawhidis’ justify their
agenda of purification in terms of moral reform aimed at producing morally grounded
and responsible citizens, the followers of the Sunnat Jamaat, led by the Jummah
Mosque, assert the legitimacy of their traditions by virtue of their being recognized by
the Mauritian state as the main representative of Muslim ‘ancestral culture’. The state
thus treats the Sunnat Jamaat as a main force in shaping citizens grounded in the kind
of moral values which make them withstand the negative effects of ‘development’ and
suitable for successful coexistence with other Mauritians, providing the followers of
the Sunnat Jamaat with legitimization in what would otherwise be an internal debate
about Islamic tradition’.
Conclusion
Recent writings on Mauritius have tended to describe the inter-ethnic coexistence for
which the island has become well known as a result of pragmatic compromises.
Thomas Eriksen, for example, has argued that a set of ‘common denominators’ (:
) has enabled relatively successful coexistence among Mauritians. A growing sense of
Mauritian nationhood is sustained by a common education system and an increas-
ingly ‘meritocratic’ integration into a capitalist wage economy (Eriksen ).17 Here
both pragmatic accommodation and a putatively intensifying Mauritian nationalism
across ethnic lines have been analysed as unrelated to religious values and discourses.
The emergent post-colonial Mauritian sense of nationhood is thus portrayed as
entirely secular, with religious practices and values playing no role in it. Secularism,
indeed, replaces religious practices and values with a ‘more universalist symbolic
system, namely supra-ethnic nationalism’ (Eriksen : ).
Religion promotes cultural integration; but by contrast with the Medieval Church, operating in a
universe that was largely homogeneous, the religions of Mauritius represent exclusive and mutually
excluding forms of integration. When it is politicized, religion thus competes directly with nation-
hood in this kind of society. When it is not, religious diversity is compatible with Mauritian nation-
alism (Eriksen : ).
Here, secularism and political religiosity are not in a dialectical tension, but per-
ceived in terms of a zero-sum antagonism presupposing a normative liberal contrast
between a problematic politicization of religion and a more benign confinement of
religion to a sphere of the non-political. However, as I have tried to argue, as religion
becomes part of nationhood and discourses of coexistence, religious practices and
values inevitably become politicized and a focus of contestation, even in their most
seemingly ‘private’ or ‘anti-political’ forms such as personal piety and moral rectitude
(cf. Asad : -).18
The much greater emphasis placed by Mauritian state institutions on the public per-
formance of diasporic ‘ancestral cultures’ centred on religious traditions as compared
to those cultural forms which are portrayed as locally created suggests that those Mau-
ritians with recognized claims on such ‘ancestral cultures’ with origins elsewhere are
more centrally placed in a post-colonial Mauritian nation than those who lack such
claims, such as the Creoles. As Mauritian nationhood cannot be neatly separated from
issues of ethnic difference, the separation of Mauritian nationhood from religious
values and solidarities is equally questionable, let alone the suggestion that the 
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cultivation of religious traditions in the context of a conscious effort to accommodate
religious diversity could be in any way depoliticized.
As I have sought to show, internal Muslim debates testify to a ‘spill-over’ of a poli-
tics of secularism based on a mobilization of ‘ancestral’ values into disputes about reli-
gious reform and authority. At the same time, it is impossible to relegate religiously
based ‘ancestral cultures’ to a realm of the private or describe them as purely internal
to the communities defined by them, since Mauritian cultural politics positions them
as key components of a Mauritian nation and as guarantors of peaceful coexistence.
Attributing Mauritian coexistence exclusively to a set of pragmatic arrangements and
cross-ethnic commonalities underestimates the extent to which secularism constitutes
a moral project, a field of values and dispositions shaping national subjects. Instead of
developing an alternative language of national solidarity, the way secularism is lived as
the search for equitable coexistence in an officially multi-religious polity indicates that
the moral imperatives of the secular are closely articulated with the responsibilities
demanded by religious tradition.
NOTES
Fieldwork in Mauritius was carried out in , - and  and was supported by the University of
Chicago Council for Advanced Studies in Peace and International Cooperation, the Wenner-Gren Founda-
tion, and by a Washington University Grimm Traveling Fellowship to Asia. The University of Mauritius pro-
vided valuable help during my research and here I would especially like to thank Vinesh Hookoomsing and
Shawkat Toorawa. I also thank John Bowen for his helpful comments on this article. Most of all, I am
indebted to the many Mauritians without whose support and friendship my research would have been
impossible.
1 Of course, both diasporic and ‘indigenous’ cultural practices and symbols have to be understood as to
a great extent locally created. My concern here is to highlight the differences in their ideological represen-
tations as direct continuations of traditions essentially imagined to be elsewhere or as uniquely particular
to the island.
2 For example, despite the long-standing complaints of several intellectuals (e.g. Virasawmy ), in stark
contrast to the teaching and cultivation of the rarely used ancestral languages, the practice of Mauritian
Creole receives little support and recognition by the Mauritian state.
3 Although presented as a policy of ‘unity in diversity’, this approach to cultural citizenship has in fact
exclusionist implications. This is because not all Mauritians, in particular the descendants of African and
Malagasy slaves known as Creoles, have recognized claims on legitimizing ‘ancestral cultures’ and ancestral
languages with origins outside Mauritius (Laville ).
4 According to the constitution, Mauritians are divided into four principal ‘communities’: Hindus ( per
cent), Muslims ( per cent), Sino-Mauritians ( per cent), and the General Population ( per cent). The
General Population is defined as all Mauritians who do not belong to the three aforementioned categories.
De facto these are Creoles and Franco-Mauritians, and are Christian, overwhelmingly Catholic. The General
Population is thus implicitly defined as the Christian population of Mauritius of non-Chinese origin. Of all
the official communities, only the small and multi-religious Sino-Mauritian community is not defined in
terms of religion.
5 The spectre of the destructive communalism was recently invoked by inter-ethnic violence. Following
the February  death under suspicious circumstances in police custody of a popular singer of Creole
background, there were violent clashes between protesters and looters of largely poor Creole background
and the Hindu-dominated police force. Following this first round of riots Hindu mobs attacked and in two
cases burned down Creole neighbourhoods. The riots left four people dead and caused direct and indirect
damage estimated at $ million.
6 The National Urdu Institute, th Anniversary , Souvenir Magazine, p. . Port Louis, the National
Urdu Institute.
7 Second World Urdu Conference, Republic of Mauritius, - August , Souvenir Magazine, p. . Port
Louis, the National Urdu Institute/Urdu-Speaking Union.
8 Ramayana Centre in Mauritius, Organizer (New Delhi),  September .
9 Ibid.
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10 ‘SAJ and values of Ramayana: from then to now and beyond’, Mauritius Times,  August . Sir
Anerood Jugnauth is reported to have used Hindi for this statement: Rajniti men ramayan mera sabse bara
adarsh rahi hai.
11 Bhakti: a devotional path in Hindu tradition characterized by emotional attraction to a personal God.
Invoking bhakti in this context emphasizes absolute devotion and sacrifice for a higher goal. Shakti 
(Sanskrit: ‘power’ or ‘energy’): the absolute power and energy associated with the divine mother in Hindu
tradition.
12 Certainly, Mauritians of other communities did not all agree with this reading of Jugnauth’s recourse
to Hindu tradition to describe the way he had led the country for a total of sixteen years. See ‘Séculier vs.
laïque – Le Ramayana, SAJ et la laïcité’ in the daily L’Express,  November .
13 Sunnis are the vast majority among Mauritian Muslims. There are also two small communities of Shiites
of Gujarati background on the island, Must‘ali Ismaelis (Bohra) and Twelver Shiites (Khoja Ithna ‘Ashari).
Further, there are also Ahmadis, whose claim to be Muslims is recognized by the constitution and by non-
Muslim Mauritians in general, while often denied by other Mauritian Muslims. The Sunnat Jamaat is also
linked to the Sufi order of the Qadriyya, to which the Kutchi Memons are closely attached (Jahangeer-Chojoo
: -).
14 On the Tablighi Jamaat, see Metcalf ().
15 In Mauritius, this purist form of Islam is often identified by the term tawhid, oneness (of God), which
refers to the Islam of Deobandi-affiliated reformists as well as that of persons, such as Imam Beharry, who
promote a more Saudi-orientated reformism.
16 Urdu Week, ‘Urdu khidmat-i Islam men – Urdu in the service of Islam’, - April . Souvenir 
Magazine, p. . Port Louis, Islamic Cultural Centre.
17 One might argue that these conditions are also found in multi-ethnic Indian urban environments such
as Mumbai which are characterized by high levels of ethnic tension and violence. In fact, Nandy (, )
has targeted exactly those commonalities as responsible for the rise of violent Hindu nationalism.
18 See also Mahmood (: -, ) on how the seemingly apolitical practices of piety of the Egyptian
women’s mosque movement do in fact constitute new forms of political agency.
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Politique de la diaspora et moralité du sécularisme : les identités
musulmanes et l’autorité islamique à Maurice
Résumé
Les travaux antérieurs sur la coexistence interethnique à Maurice présentaient le sécularisme comme le
seul lieu possible de l’unité nationale, tout en décrivant celle-ci comme clairement séparée des traditions
religieuses. L’auteur se concentre pour sa part sur la compréhension du sécularisme chez les musulmans
mauriciens dans le contexte d’une politique de « cultures ancestrales » diasporiques, et analyse le sécu-
larisme comme un domaine de la moralité indissociable des questions de réforme religieuse et d’authen-
ticité. La discussion du matériel ethnographique obtenu à Maurice suggère que l’opposition entre
séculaire et religieux doit être abordée comme une tension productive et non comme une antinomie
libérale.
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